The Iatrogenic Paradox: When Information Operations Undermine Strategic Objectives
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Authors
Eerhart, Daniel
Issue Date
2025-09
Type
Language
en_US
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Abstract
This paper examines the phenomenon of iatrogenic influence, information operations that unintentionally produce outcomes counter to their intended goals, and argues that the U.S. military’s current approach to information operations (IO) requires fundamental reassessment. Using the war in Afghanistan as the central case study, the paper demonstrates how two decades of military-led IO, despite tactical successes, contributed to strategic failure by inadvertently strengthening adversarial groups such as the Taliban. The analysis traces the historical evolution of both military and non-military U.S. influence capabilities, highlighting the longstanding dominance of civilian agencies in global information efforts and the limitations inherent to military-led campaigns, particularly regarding cultural understanding, credibility, and long-term engagement. The paper assesses structural gaps, organizational overlap, and the risks of information fratricide across the U.S. government. It concludes by recommending a refined, specialized military IO role focused on mission sets historically proven effective, such as surrender appeals, civilian non-interference messaging, and enemy demoralization, while shifting broader influence responsibilities back to civilian organizations with the expertise and longevity required for strategic impact. These recommendations aim to reduce the risk of iatrogenic effects and enable a more integrated, precise, and sustainable national information strategy.
Description
This manuscript analyzes the unintended, counterproductive effects of military information operations during the Global War on Terror and offers recommendations to refine the U.S. military’s role in the information environment.
Citation
Eerhart, Daniel. “The Iatrogenic Paradox: When Information Operations Undermine Strategic Objectives.” PRISM 11, no. 1 (2025): 100–116. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48844367.
Publisher
Irregular Warfare Center
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PubMed ID
DOI
ISSN
21570663