

SCHEMING, SCANDAL, THREATS, PRESS, AND DISUNION IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1800

BY WILLIAM HOGAN

On February 11th, 1801, the President of the Senate stood before the combined House of Representatives and Senate and announced the electoral votes for the presidential election of 1800. Those in the room and Americans at large were not surprised, as many had predicted the count with relative certainty in December.¹ The President of the Senate, Republican Thomas Jefferson, had tied 73 to 73 with his running mate, Aaron Burr; the pair eked out a victory over John Adams and Charles C. Pinckney (65 and 64 votes, respectively).² They would now duel each other in a lame-duck, Federalist House that regarded Jefferson as an atheistic radical and Burr as an opportunistic grifter. The intrigue and scandal leading up to this moment and six-day battle that followed drove the fledgling United States to the edge of disunion.

From December 1800 to February 1801, the most divisive months of the presidential election of 1800, Republican accusations of foul play on the part of the Hamiltonian Federalists were largely unfounded. Such accusations centered around a plot to rob Jefferson or the Republicans of the Presidency, motivating even prominent Republican leaders to anticipate or plan for violence and disunion. Despite fervent rumors, the actions of prominent Federalists were a telling sign of some moderation. In fact, Federalist actions during the election revealed a greater capacity for toleration than most contemporary opponents of the Federalists would have been willing to believe. Thus, the events of December to February demonstrated that notions of animosity between the leadership of the two parties and the scandals associated with the election were largely overstated by contemporary sources.

Leading up to the eventual electoral tie, the summer and fall of 1800 were rife with partisan tension punctuated by the specter of war with France. As Republicans feared the continued development of a pro-British aristocratic elite and assaults upon the free press under another

¹ "On the Election of President," *The Spectator*, (New York, N.Y.), December 31, 1800.

² "Wednesday, February 11, 1801," in *Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875*, Vol. 3, *Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States*, (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 2003), 799.

Adams administration, so too did the Federalists fear the importation of radicalism from France and the disruption of America's growing commercial might under Jefferson. Adams' Sedition Act had been used to convict no fewer than ten Americans, editors of Republican newspapers who severely criticized his administration.³ On the other side of the spectrum, Federalists spent the last years of the Adams administration preparing for war with France and feared that, if elected president, Jefferson would compromise American interests to support France. In short, each party believed the victory of their opponent would undermine the Constitution, liberty, and American sovereignty.

Partisan newspapers thrived in this atmosphere. During the election, Republican and Federalist publications strengthened the divide within the American populace through opinion pieces and even used their platforms to attack other publications. Federalist papers matter-of-factly referred to Republicans as "Jacobins" while Republican papers labeled Federalists the "British faction," not even meriting the title of 'party.'⁴ The implications of such labels were obvious, their readers ought to view the opposing party as un-American, aligned with foreign actors for personal gain. Furthermore, partisan newspapers routinely made outrageous claims that heightened anxieties leading up to the election. One Federalist paper went so far as to predict that, if Jefferson be elected, the "soil will be soaked with blood," a concerningly fantastic prediction sure to stoke Hamiltonian Federalist worries.⁵ Many Hamiltonians fervently believed that Jefferson was irreligious, beholden only to the masses. One Federalist paper even claimed that Jefferson had no God but "The People."⁶ Likewise, prominent Republican papers made outrageous (but more grounded) claims about their Federalist opponents. Pennsylvania's *Herald of Liberty* claimed that Hamilton, the "evil genius of America," planned to supplant Adams with C.C. Pinckney, who would serve as a puppet for Hamilton.⁷ Such Republican accusations tended to

³ Alan J. Farber, "Reflections on the Sedition Act of 1800," *American Bar Association Journal*, 62, (1976): 325.

⁴ "For the Gazette of the United States", *Gazette of the United States*, (Philadelphia, Penn.) December 3, 1800; *Telegraph and Daily Advertiser*, (Baltimore, Md.), January 10, 1801.

⁵ *Connecticut Courant*, (Hartford, Conn.), September 20, 1800.

⁶ *Philadelphia Gazette*, (Philadelphia, Penn.), May 5, 1800.

⁷ "A Letter of John Adams," *Herald of Liberty*, (Washington, Penn.), September 15, 1800.

be less inflammatory than their Federalist counterparts. Regardless, the partisan press fanned the flames of discord and actively depicted the two parties as incompatible. Such notions of incompatibility were compounded by reports of scandal, including targeted attacks on the characters of political opponents often used to establish moral certainty to contempt for the other party.

The election of 1800 was fraught with scandal; Federalist scandals printed in Republican papers heightened tensions that split the party between Adams and Hamilton. These scandals ran the gamut of political intrigue, from fallacious personal attacks to truthful reports of correspondence. The relationship between Alexander Hamilton and the Republican *Aurora* of Philadelphia perfectly characterized this phenomenon. The *Aurora* was a thorn in Hamilton's side, publishing rumor after rumor of the leader of the Federalist opposition. After Aaron Burr's New York Republicans trounced Hamilton in state legislature elections of May 1800, the *Aurora* reported that Hamilton was at the head of a scheme to use the lame-duck Federalist legislature to change the method by which New York selected its electors.⁸ This shocking rumor was true. Hamilton had petitioned Governor John Jay to enact his plan for "the great cause of social order."⁹ Hamilton's shortsighted plan would have used the recently defeated Federalist state legislature to remove the power of elector selection from the legislature; instead, New York would select its electors by popular vote within congressional districts. This would have ensured that a fair portion of New York's electors would remain Federalist, a clear subversion of the May election. The *Aurora* once again set upon Hamilton in October, when it informed its readers about Hamilton's pamphlet decrying John Adams, three days before it was published.¹⁰ Despite these notable examples of partisan attempts to discredit opponents, most rumored scandals amounted to very little. When the election became bogged down in the House of Representatives, Republican papers were flush with frenzied accusations of sedition and civil war. The *Aurora* even mistakenly informed its readers that Federalist militias had assembled in Philadelphia to challenge Jefferson.¹¹

⁸ *Aurora General Advertiser*, (Philadelphia), May 7, 1800.

⁹ Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, May 7, 1800, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. 24: November 1799 – June 1800, ed. Harold C. Syrett, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 466.

¹⁰ *Aurora General Advertiser*, (Philadelphia, PA), October 21, 1800.

¹¹ "From the Washington Federalist," *Gazette of the United States*, February 16, 1800.

Given these instances of scandal and panic, it comes as no surprise that deep anxiety accompanied the election among America's politically involved and increasingly literate population.

The Federalist Party's failure to unite around a single candidate was certainly a key indicator of the heightened anxiety of 1800. Discord among the Federalists impeded efforts to present a united front against Jefferson. Tension between the moderate pro-Adams Federalists and the Hamiltonians peaked after Adams fired McHenry and Pickering, both Hamiltonian acolytes, from his cabinet in May 1800. Adams once again infuriated Hamilton in June, when he liquidated the Provisional Army, effectively relieving Hamilton of military command.¹² These events irrevocably set Hamilton against Adams' reelection, even stating that he would accept Jefferson as Vice President if Pinckney was President.¹³ The fallout prompted one Republican paper to claim that three parties now existed: "The Republicans, the Adamites, and the Pickeronians. The latter party consists of those who have leagued with Hamilton."¹⁴ The Federalist rift was again widened on October 24th, when Hamilton published a pamphlet that tried to slash Adams' reelection to ribbons. Hamilton charged that Adams' personal instability and "ungovernable temper" made him unfit for reelection.¹⁵ Republicans delighted in the discord and the *Aurora* quickly published full copies of the letter.¹⁶ While Federalists had conservative reactions to the pamphlet (no doubt trying to preserve party unity), Republican condemnation of Hamilton's vanity and pettiness was uniform. The editor of the *Aurora* even mused that Hamilton had damaged his own character more than the *Aurora* ever could.¹⁷ Ironically, Hamilton argued that the letter did not go far enough;

¹² Ron Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2004): 616.

¹³ Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick, May 10, 1800, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. 24: November 1799 – June 1800, ed. Harold C. Syrett, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 474-75.

¹⁴ *Herald of Liberty*, June 2, 1800.

¹⁵ "Letter from Alexander Hamilton, Concerning the Public Conduct and Character of John Adams, Esq. President of the United States," October 24, 1800, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. 25: July 1800 - April 1802, ed. Harold C. Syrett, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 222.

¹⁶ Harold C. Syrett, ed., *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. 25: July 1800 - April 1802, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 177.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 181.

alas, he wrote, “the Federal Stomach would not bear a stronger dose.”¹⁸ Months of internal disunion weakened the Federalists; consequentially, the party entered December unsure if Adams or Pinckney would carry more electors.

Despite obvious division among the Federalists, Republican electors failed to give Jefferson a lead over Burr, causing a tie and sparking a constitutional crisis. In December, the last state electors voted, and it became clear that the Republicans did not drop a vote from Burr to ensure Jefferson would not tie with his running mate. The tie between Jefferson and Burr has been attributed to two possibilities. Either Republican electors toed the party line with such discipline that no man dropped a vote or Republican electors distrusted their counterparts and voted uniformly, expecting for some Republicans to be faithless electors. This second theory, championed by Joanne Freeman in “Corruption and Compromise in the Election of 1800,” is especially intriguing, as it is the best explanation for why not a single man dropped a vote from Burr.¹⁹ Conversely, disciplined Federalist electors voted for Adams across the board and dropped a single vote from Pinckney, dashing Hamilton’s plans.²⁰ Regardless of why it came to be, the tie opened the door to scheming within the Federalist-controlled House, scheming that prominent Federalists fought to prevent.

Federalists in the House and within the party at-large feared the election of Jefferson; to prevent it, they had two legal recourses, the consequences of which would have done irreparable damage to the dignity of their party and to the Constitution. The least destructive and most popular path to defeating Jefferson was to elect Aaron Burr. This was not farfetched since each of the 16 state delegations had one vote and the Federalists controlled most of the state delegations. The second and most destructive path was to delay a vote until inauguration day, March 4th, at which time the President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, a Federalist, would become President until a new election was held. This option was

¹⁸ Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry, November 13, 1800, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. 25: July 1800 - April 1802, ed. Harold C. Syrett, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 236.

¹⁹ Joanne B. Freeman, “Corruption and Compromise in the Election of 1800,” in *The Revolution of 1800: Democracy, Race, and the New Republic*, ed. James P. Horn, Jan E. Lewis, and Peter S. Onuf, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002): 106.

²⁰ “Wednesday, February 11, 1801,” in *Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates*.

seriously considered by Hamiltonian Federalists and seriously feared by Republicans, as it was questionably legal under a 1792 law that laid out how to select a President should one be removed.²¹ On December 19th, 1800, Senator Gouverneur Morris of New York wrote to Hamilton and suggested that this plan was being discussed within Federalist circles.²² Four days earlier, Jefferson wrote to Burr and informed him that he feared that should they tie, the Federalists would prevent a vote in the House and “let the government devolve on a President of the Senate.”²³ Even sensationalist newspapers caught wind of such rumors, claiming that Federalists would force Jefferson out of office and select one of their own, as the *Guardian of Liberty* predicted, to “become President of the United States.”²⁴ Clearly, there were substantiated claims that Jefferson’s election would be contested in the House of Representatives.

The result of either course of action would have been disastrous for the dignity of the Federalist Party, the sanctity of the Constitution, and the unity of the nation. It would also lend great weight to the narrative that the Federalists would do anything to win. Republicans across the country carefully calculated responses to both Federalist paths. Governor Thomas McKean of Pennsylvania and Governor James Monroe of Virginia were fully prepared to mobilize the state militias to march on the capitol, should Burr be elected or no vote take place. Monroe went so far as to send a militia officer to scout out the federal armory in Richmond, to seize weapons should the need arise.²⁵ In a March 21st letter to Jefferson, McKean admitted that plans were in place to raise “arms for upwards of twenty thousand ... and an order would have been issued for the arresting and bringing to justice every member of Congress ... who

²¹ Hugh Henry Brackenridge to Thomas Jefferson, January 19, 1801. in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. 32, 1 June 1800 to 16 February 1801, ed. Barbara B. Oberg, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005): 484.

²² Gouverneur Morris to Alexander Hamilton, December 19, 1800, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. 25: July 1800 - April 1802, ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 266-268.

²³ Thomas Jefferson to Aaron Burr, December 15, 1800, in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. 32, 1 June 1800 to 16 February 1801, ed. Barbara B. Oberg (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005): 307.

²⁴ *The Guardian of Liberty*, (Newport, R.I.), February 7, 1801.

²⁵ James R. Sharp, *American Politics in The Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993): 270.

should have been concerned in the treason.”²⁶ Clearly, this would have been tantamount to a rebellion and underscores the anxiety that hung over Republican states in February 1801. Jefferson himself informed James Madison that if Burr was elected, it “would be resisted by arms” in many Republican states.²⁷ However, even if Burr were to be elected, Jefferson refused to entertain the idea of civil war. In a separate letter, he told Monroe that any success at denying him the presidency would be met with “a convention to reorganize the government, and to amend it,” he would “not receive the government on capitulation.”²⁸

Despite the image that Republican newspapers painted of him and his allies, Hamilton took it upon himself to persuade Federalists in the House to not oppose Jefferson’s election. After his near-miss at dividing the Federalist party in October, Hamilton came to his senses and moderated his position. To the surprise of his compatriots and the ignorance of Republican papers, Hamilton championed Jefferson’s election. He dismissed the President Pro-Tempore scheme as absurd and worked to prevent Burr from being elected. His reason for choosing Jefferson was quite succinctly stated in one of his many letters to Federalist representatives: Burr “has no principle public or private. As a politician his sole spring of action is an inordinate ambition.”²⁹ Hamilton knew Burr as an opportunist without moral convictions. This is not to say that Hamilton changed his opinion on Jefferson, quite the opposite is true. Hamilton wrote Senator Morris that “if there be a man in the world I ought to hate it is Jefferson.”³⁰ However, the most consequential of Hamilton’s arguments were brought to Representative James Bayard, of

²⁶ Thomas McKean to Thomas Jefferson, March 21, 1801, in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. 33, 17 February to 30 April 1801, ed. Barbara B. Oberg, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005): 391.

²⁷ Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, February 18, 1801, in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. 33, 17 February to 30 April 1801, ed. Barbara B. Oberg, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005): 16.

²⁸ Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, February 15, 1801, in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. 32, 1 June 1800 to 16 February 1801, ed. Barbara B. Oberg, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005): 594.

²⁹ Alexander Hamilton to James A. Bayard, December 27, 1800, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. 25: July 1800 - April 1802, ed. Harold C. Syrett, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 276.

³⁰ Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, December 26, 1800, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. 25: July 1800 - April 1802, ed. Harold C. Syrett, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 275.

Delaware. Hamilton warned Bayard of the moral deprecation of a Burr presidency and pleaded with him to “save our country from so great a calamity.”³¹ Hamilton was prepared to tolerate differences of opinion and even cooperate with Jefferson, actively convincing representatives to vote for him, but he was unwilling to tolerate Burr’s character deficiencies. This argument no doubt helped to convince Bayard to cast the controversial deciding vote that secured Jefferson’s presidency.

The plot to elect Burr over Jefferson was ultimately defeated by the conscience of James Bayard, who, like Hamilton, feared that such a result would taint the Constitution and even risk civil war. As the House prepared to vote in February, Republican leaders and newspapers feared that Federalists would subvert what they saw as a Jefferson electoral victory. The *Guardian of Liberty* cautioned its readers that “there has been no stone left unturned, to the defeat the election of Mr. Jefferson.”³² This was false, there were no motions in the House to postpone the vote. On the contrary, on February 10th, before it was officially known that there was a tie between Jefferson and Burr, a motion to only vote between the two Republicans was defeated 36 to 59.³³ It is important to note that James Bayard voted for this motion. Thus, when the House entered voting procedure on February 11th, Delaware’s one man, Federalist delegation was in Burr’s camp only to hold the party line.

Bayard, much like Hamilton, was willing to tolerate Jefferson and risk his standing among the Federalists because he would not tolerate the fallout of electing Burr. Upon entering voting procedure for the first time on February 11th, Bayard unhappily cast his vote for Burr and did so for the next 34 votes that followed. These 34 votes would have the same tally, Jefferson winning eight states (all Republican states) and Burr winning six (all Federalist states).³⁴ The Vermont and Maryland delegations were split and turned in no ballot. During this process, Bayard became acutely aware that the election was more than Federalist against Republican, he feared that preventing the election of Jefferson

³¹ Alexander Hamilton to James A. Bayard, December 27, 1800, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 277.

³² *The Guardian of Liberty* (Newport, R.I.), February 7, 1801.

³³ “Tuesday, February 10, 1801,” in *Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875*, Vol. 3, *Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States* (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 2003), 795.

³⁴ “Wednesday, February 11, 1801,” in *Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates*, 801.

would jeopardize the Constitution. Bayard recognized the delicate position he found himself in and wrote to Governor Richard Bassett of Delaware that: “if Delaware be added to those votes who have declared, Jefferson cannot be elected.”³⁵ Though he would initially follow the party line and vote for Burr, he told Bassett: “I have not yet determined as to the part which I shall take.”³⁶ Clearly, Bayard by no means fits the archetype of the unscrupulous Federalist, willing to subvert Jefferson’s election at any cost.

Bayard, at risk to his own reputation, convinced Federalists from Maryland and Vermont to turn in blank ballots, allowing their Republican counterparts to secure Jefferson’s election. The actions of Bayard and these other Federalists certainly disproves that most powerful Federalists would do anything to achieve political goals. Bayard was clearly concerned about his decision to decide for Jefferson, writing Bassett that it was not safe to discuss the matter “by Post or even to write at all.”³⁷ After six days of inconclusive voting, Bayard told Bassett that he would go against the party “to not risk the constitution or civil war.”³⁸ This course of action was not without risk. When Bayard called a meeting to announce his intentions on February 16th, “violent spirits of the Party denounced [him] as a Deserter.”³⁹ Some incensed representatives from New England even “declared they meant to go without a constitution and take the risk of a Civil War.”⁴⁰ Bayard’s decision was not well received by all Federalists. Nonetheless, his announcement spurred Vermont and Maryland to his cause. Lewis Richard Morris, Vermont’s lone Federalist representative, announced that he would withdraw his vote and allow his Republican counterpart to vote alone. Maryland’s Federalist

³⁵ James Bayard to Richard Bassett, January 3, 1801, in *Papers of James A. Bayard, 1796-1815*, Vol. 2, ed. Elizabeth Donnan (Washington: The American Historical Association, 1915): 117.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ James Bayard to Richard Bassett, February 10, 1801, in *Papers of James A. Bayard, 1796-1815*, Vol. 2, ed. Elizabeth Donnan (Washington: The American Historical Association, 1915): 124.

³⁸ James Bayard to Richard Bassett, February 16, 1801, in *Papers of James A. Bayard, 1796-1815*, Vol. 2, ed. Elizabeth Donnan, (Washington: The American Historical Association, 1915): 126.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ James Bayard to McLane, February 17, 1801, in *Papers of James A. Bayard, 1796-1815*, Vol. 2, ed. Elizabeth Donnan, (Washington: The American Historical Association, 1915): 128.

representatives followed suit. The next day, February 17th, Jefferson received 10 states in the 36th and final ballot.⁴¹ The election was decided for Jefferson. Bayard's meeting undeniably altered the trajectory of the young republic and clearly demonstrates the existence of moderation. His public declaration to yield for Jefferson influenced other Federalists to do the same.

The decision to go against elements of the Federalist party and support Jefferson demonstrates a dedication to the continued success of the republic. The preservation of the Constitution was more important than the short-term goals of the Federalist party. Men like Bayard recognized that Republican states had firmly decided for Jefferson, to supplant their choice with Burr (or to even consider the President Pro Tempore scheme) would have been a detriment to national unity. Governors McKean and Monroe serve as reminders that there was no guarantee of a peaceful conclusion to the election. After all, if Burr were elected or a Federalist senator ushered into the presidency, by Jefferson's own admission, Republican states would not recognize the legitimacy of that government.⁴² It is not hard to imagine a rebellious response, considering the recent memory of the Whiskey Rebellion and Fries Rebellion. If Republican citizens had rebelled against taxes and perceived incursions upon their liberties, certainly they might have rebelled against a 'stolen' election. Thus, most Federalists were willing to tolerate and even support Jefferson to keep the peace and to secure a future for the Constitution they ratified barely a decade ago.

Furthermore, as demonstrated by Hamilton, several Federalists could tolerate perceived political failings but not moral failings. Thus, Jefferson, though their political opponent, was favored over the more politically agreeable but less virtuous Burr. Hamilton's letters to Federalist leaders, including Bayard, indicate this point. Yes, Burr's policies might have been more palatable to Federalists, but his lack of character would have brought "disgrace abroad and ruin at home."⁴³ Burr was "sanguine enough to hope everything, daring enough to attempt

⁴¹ "February 17, 1801" in *Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875*, Vol. 3, *Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States*, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 2003), 803.

⁴² Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, February 15, 1801, in *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 594.

⁴³ Alexander Hamilton to James A. Bayard, December 27, 1800, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 277.

everything, wicked enough to scruple nothing.”⁴⁴ On the other hand, though many considered Jefferson’s politics too radical, he was no doubt predictable and certainly morally palatable. Jefferson represented a known challenge to Federalism; Burr represented an unknown evil to Federalism.

Thus, Bayard, Hamilton, and the other prominent Federalists that secured Jefferson’s election serve as examples that animosity between the Federalists and Republicans was overexaggerated in the press. The mood of the Federalist party underwent a significant easing between December 1800 and February 1801. The anxiety and distrust that characterized the election gave way to a lukewarm, albeit cautious, acceptance of Jefferson. Nowhere is this more evident than in the very press that had once pilloried Jefferson. Philadelphia’s *Gazette of The United States* had railed against Jefferson over the course of the election; it had even hinted that Federalists should prevent Jefferson’s election with the New England militia.⁴⁵ However, on February 18th it changed tunes and instead declared that “it is right for the public to support that Mr. Jefferson’s administration must be tried before it can be known.”⁴⁶ It went even further after Jefferson’s inauguration, declaring that “we shall yet be prosperous and happy.”⁴⁷ These were not the words of men unwilling to tolerate their political opponents. The intrigue of the election of 1800 and sensational journalism had heightened national tensions to the point of irrationality, obscuring the moderation that existed under the surface. With the election of Jefferson, that moderation was restored. The Federalist’s mood had moderated, revealing their capacity to tolerate and even cooperate with men of character, even if they were Republicans.

⁴⁴ *Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, December 24, 1800*, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Vol. 25: July 1800 - April 1802, ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 272.

⁴⁵ “From the Washington Federalist,” *Gazette of the United States*, February 16, 1800.

⁴⁶ “From the New England Paladium,” *Gazette of the United States*, February 18, 1800.

⁴⁷ “To Our Readers,” *Gazette of the United States*, March 5, 1800.