Threats and the Public Constraint on Military Spending
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Authors
Di Giuseppe, Matthew
Aspide, Alessia
Becker, Jordan
Issue Date
2024-07-01
Type
Journal articles
Language
Keywords
Military Spending , NATO , EU , Russia , Ukraine
Alternative Title
Abstract
The public places an important constraint on funding security in Europe, and austerity risks making the constraint tighter. Several recent studies show that curtailing military spending is a popular way to reduce debt in Europe. Yet it remains unclear if military spending aversion persists when threats are salient. We fielded an original survey experiment in Italy weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine to examine how information about security threats influences military spending preferences and fiscal trade-offs. We found that information about threats increases support for military spending. To validate the survey experiment, we recontacted and remeasured our respondent's preferences three weeks after Russia's invasion and find evidence consistent with our initial experiment. Our findings suggest that, while public opposition to military spending remains high in Italy, external threats dampen the public's opposition to military spending, even under high debt burdens.
Description
Citation
DiGiuseppe, Matthew, Alessia Aspide, and Jordan Becker. 2024. “Threats and the Public Constraint on Military Spending.” British Journal of Political Science 54 (3): 649–666. doi:10.1017/S0007123423000443.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press