Russian Society and Foreign Policy: Mass and Elite Orientations After Crimea
Abstract
Most Russians applaud the official narrative that Russia has reemerged as a great power. Yet they increasingly disagree with the assertion of the Kremlin that the United States is a looming external danger and a subversive force in Russian domestic politics. In line with these opinions, many Russians balk at the costs of confrontation with the West, demonstrating the initially limited and now waning political significance of the “Crimea euphoria” (or “Crimea effect”) and “rally ‘round the flag” phenomena. Russian elites often differ from the general public in their stronger backing for a more assertive foreign posture. Nevertheless, such preferences are frequently moderated by the apprehension that Russia will neglect domestic modernization indefinitely if its foreign policy is confrontational.
Description
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journal-article
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Keywords
Foreign Policy, Russia
Citation
Thomas Sherlock (2020) Russian Society and Foreign Policy: Mass and Elite Orientations After Crimea, Problems of Post-Communism, 67:1, 1-23, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2018.1561190