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Search for the Philosopher's Stone

Improving Interagency Cooperation in Tactical Military Operations

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March 23, 2018

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Abstract

The United States National Security Strategy and Department of Defense (DoD) joint doctrine recognizes that the complexity of the contemporary operational environment requires the United States to pursue whole-of-government solutions that integrate civil-military interagency cooperation. In particular, the military requires the expertise of interagency partners in stability operations. Army doctrine recognizes that interagency synchronization occurs at all echelons, although it has yet to fully institutionalize interagency integration at tactical levels. This paper examines two historical case studies where interagency integration was essential to tactical mission success: DoD—Interagency response to Ebola in West Africa, and DoD—Interagency coordination for Africa Command (AFRICOM) Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). The conditions that led to successful implementation of these programs are highlighted with an analysis across a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership-Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF) framework. Both case studies provide valuable lessons on how the United States Army may better integrate interagency at the tactical level of stability operations. The author based on his analysis also proposes several recommendations across the DOTMLPF framework for more effective interagency integration in future DOD tactical operations.

Acronyms

AAR	After Action Report
AFRICOM	Africa Command (United States)
AOC	Army Operating Concept
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
COCOM	Combatant Command
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DoD	Department of Defense (United States)
DoS	Department of State (United States)
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership/Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
GAO	Government Accountability Office (United States)
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HQ	Headquarters
JFC	Joint Forces Command
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Interorganizational, Multinational
JP	Joint Publication
JTF	Joint Task Force
LNO	Liaison Officer
MCTP	Mission Command Training Program
MoH	Liberian Ministry of Health
NECC	National Ebola Coordination Center
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSP	National Solidarity Program
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USARAF	US Army Africa

USDA	US Department of Agriculture
USG	US Government
UN	United Nations
WHO	World Health Organization

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Introduction

> The Army of 2025 and Beyond will effectively employ lethal and non-lethal overmatch against any adversary to prevent, shape, and win conflicts and achieve national interests. It will leverage cross-cultural and regional experts to operate among populations, promote regional security, and be interoperable with the other Military Services, United States Government agencies and allied and partner nations.
>
> — Combined Arms Center, *The Army Vision: Strategic Advantage in a Complex World*

Over a decade ago, the stability and reconstruction missions of Iraq and Afghanistan revealed critical capability gaps within the US military. The military, while conducting combat operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, was also simultaneously conducting stability operations—development, governance, rule-of-law promotion, conflict resolution, and similar activities—at the local level with little guidance and oversight. While young leaders at the tactical and local level admirably sought to conduct these stability operations, the reality showed that the military was untrained, was unequipped, and lacked the expertise to effectively manage governance, development, rule-of-law promotion, and conflict resolution on the battlefield.

At the tactical level, the frustration was common among young lieutenants and captains, who, as nominal mayors of villages and towns, were expected to restore vital civil services and negotiate and resolve conflicts among feuding factions. The result was a "bipolar disorder" of sorts, as leaders planned high-value targeting raids one day; negotiated contracting issues with local firms the next day; conducted sewage, water, and educational assessments the next; and then ran microcredit grant programs the next. Our military training system mostly taught conventional *kinetic* operations; much of the *nonkinetic* stability requirements were on-the-job or figure-it-out learning in theater.

The challenges in stability operations faced by the Department of Defense (DoD) were highlighted by the US special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, who noted that DoD's efforts to spark the country's economic development, which cost between $700 million and $800 million, "accomplished nothing." The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations—a DoD unit aimed at developing war zone mining, facilitating industrial development, and fostering private investments—was considered by the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction as "an abysmal failure," lacking leadership, any clear strategy, or accountability.[1]

[1] Gould, "SIGAR."

These challenges at both the tactical and operational level are an indicator that the US military lacked the capacity and expertise to accomplish inherently nonmilitary tasks related to stability and nation building. Assuming that the expertise to do some of these tasks existed within the US government (USG), or could have been contracted by the USG, why could the military not better leverage that expertise to more effectively guide the accomplishment of the stability tasks associated with our nation building and counterinsurgency operations?

Despite the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan being national priorities requiring a comprehensive, whole-of-government civil-military strategy, the US military was required to do more than the lion's share of lifting precisely because it was the only USG organization with the manpower and capacity to deploy in an expeditionary manner. With a lack of large-scale interagency presence and with limited means to coordinate with the interagency, military battlefield commanders were often in the lead to plan and execute stability operations within their area of operations. These nonmilitary tasks inherently became military tasks—and despite a can-do attitude, many of these efforts failed due to a lack of expertise. But despite recognition from the military that they were often ill equipped for this type of mission, the problem continued because of a civilian interagency apparatus that was simply ill prepared and ill resourced to manage or coordinate with the military for these nation-building tasks for the scope and magnitude necessary.

Over the course of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, interagency integration improved as the USG surged civilian experts to advise battlefield commanders in governance and development activities. However, rather than institutionalize much of this interagency cooperation for future conflicts, much of it remains ad hoc in nature, created only for the conflicts at hand.

To be clear, the purpose of this report is not to reexamine the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan but rather to look toward the future and examine how to structure tactical formations better equipped to handle the types of complicated and complex environments that we anticipate. In part, the US Army recognizes that interagency integration is crucial to future success. The version of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, published in 2011 (after nearly a decade of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan) described the critical nature of interagency cooperation:

> Army forces operate as part of a larger national effort characterized as unified action. Army leaders must integrate their actions and operations within this larger framework, collaborating with entities outside their direct control. All echelons are required to incorporate such integration. . . . Effective unified action requires Army leaders who can understand, influence, and cooperate with unified action partners. The Army depends on its joint partners for capabilities that do not reside within the Army, and it cannot operate effectively without their

> support. Likewise, government agencies outside the Department of Defense possess knowledge, skills, and capabilities necessary for success. The active cooperation of partners often allows Army leaders to capitalize on organizational strengths while offsetting weaknesses. Only by creating a shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force—a key element of mission command—can Army leaders integrate their actions within unified action and synchronize their own operations.[2]

Inherent in this statement is a doctrinal recognition that Army operations are part of a broader national effort—"unified action"—that requires the expertise of interagency partners. Without the collaboration, integration, and synchronization with these partners at all echelons, the Army cannot operate effectively.

This discussion highlights three fundamental observations:

1. There exists a tremendous capability gap in US military formations to execute stability tasks, particularly ones focused on governance and development.
2. USG civilian agencies (including those at the state and local level) may have valuable expertise and capacity that could be leveraged in future stability operations to enhance the military's understanding of the operational environment, as well as accomplish stability tasks and objectives.
3. The future of military operations will still have a large component of stability operations requiring local and regional knowledge, cultural understanding, and technical and specialized expertise.

Today, the status of DoD and interagency integration, particularly with the Department of State (DoS) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), faces additional challenges. Agencies like DoS currently face major budgetary cuts of up to 30 percent, which will reduce their capacity to conduct expeditionary diplomacy in the future.[3] Concern over these proposed budgetary cuts was so large that in February 2017 more than 120 retired three- and four-star generals and admirals sent a letter to the House and Senate leadership in order to advocate for protecting the DoS budget. They wrote, "The State Department, USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Peace Corps and other development agencies are critical to preventing conflict and reducing the need to put our men and women in uniform in harm's way. . . . The military will lead the fight against terrorism on the battlefield, but it needs strong

[2] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, 3.

[3] Krieg and Mullery, "Trump's Budget by the Numbers."

civilian partners in the battle against the drivers of extremism—lack of opportunity, insecurity, injustice, and hopelessness."[4]

A consequence of these budgetary cuts will be further challenges to the integration of interagency partners like DoS into tactical DoD operations. Thirty-percent reductions in the DoS budget will require DoS to cut many nonessential personnel to meet existing core requirements, like manning embassies worldwide, further limiting the possibility of expanding the expeditionary capability useful for partnerships with DoD. With the prospect of these cuts on the horizon, it has become more imperative for DoD to think through the challenges that interagency integration poses at the tactical level and whether reforms may provide an effective solution despite decreasing resources.

Research Questions and Methodology

In order to contribute to this discussion, this report will examine two recent DoD-interagency case studies: the US government response to the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic and the use of US Army forces to support security cooperation activities in Africa from 2013 to 2015. The 2014 Ebola response and the role of Army forces in Africa under the regionally aligned forces (RAF) strategy provide useful lessons primarily because they represent "most likely" cases of what Army interagency integration may look like in future operations. RAF in the near term is how the Army intends to support combatant commands for security cooperation activities. Likewise, the Ebola mission represents a significant stability mission, which required tremendous civilian interagency expertise, yet was led by a military headquarters. In each case, this report will examine whether interagency integration was essential to tactical-mission success and, if it was, will identify what characteristics were required for integration.

These case studies will then be examined within a discussion of whether the Army should organize and train tactical formations (brigade combat team and below) to incorporate interagency partners into their training and operations. There are several reasons the focus of this report examines the brigade combat team (BCT) level of operations. If BCTs continue to deploy independently, especially under the Army's RAF construct, then it is worthwhile to examine BCTs' suitability for interagency integration, as well as the potential impact on BCTs. Moreover, current Army force structure designs modularity at the BCT level, which from an organizational approach allows flexibility in adding potential interagency components to a BCT's force structure. From a training perspective, deployment training is primarily

[4] Traynham, "Over 120 Retired Generals, Admirals on State and USAID Budget."

conducted at the BCT level through combat training center certifications. Finally, the BCT (compared with smaller units) is the first echelon that is built to have a staff structure that could potentially incorporate interagency partners.

A limitation of this analysis is that it focuses on interagency rather than the full spectrum of joint, interagency, interorganizational, and multinational (JIIM) cooperation. From US military doctrine, unified action involves partners from the entire JIIM spectrum; however, each element of JIIM requires a unique analysis of the best way to integrate. Joint cooperation has largely been resourced within DoD since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Interagency, the focus of this report, may be a similarly manageable task because all stakeholders are within the organization of the USG. Interorganizational and multinational integration and coordination, however, especially at a tactical level, require a host of different solutions from a policy perspective that are outside the scope of this report.

DoD analyses often use the DOTMLPF-P framework—Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership/Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy—in order to find solutions that fill identified capability gaps. In the case of this analysis, the author primarily examines doctrine, organization, training, and policy. It is assessed that these factors would have the greatest immediate impact for increased interagency coordination and cooperation in operations at the tactical level (BCT and below).

Education and personnel policies are an extremely important facet of this problem—recruiting the right people to work in an interagency environment and educating them to be able to operate and think in a whole-of-government environment is vital—but not covered in this report. The education and personnel solutions to the Army's interagency integration capability gap are large enough in scope to warrant its own study outside the context of this project. In addition, reforms in this arena would take substantial time to implement and realize improvements.

Policy solutions are also not addressed in this analysis. Such solutions are complicated, potentially requiring executive and congressional reform. While it is worthwhile to examine a potential "Goldwater-Nichols Part II" that legislatively enables interagency cooperation, as Goldwater-Nichols incorporated "jointness," the topic is also large enough to warrant its own, separate treatment. However, in this report's supporting case studies and overarching conclusion, the author will briefly address where tactical integration of interagency may nest within the greater Goldwater-Nichols Part II policy debate and the potential for future reforms.

A Discussion on Bureaucracy

> The quest for coordination is in many respects the twentieth-century equivalent of the medieval search for the philosopher's stone. If only we can find the right formula for coordination, we can reconcile the irreconcilable, harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one will dissent.
>
> —Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power*

Before exploring the case studies, this report must address several important aspects of interagency integration by examining some of the seminal works on bureaucracies to establish a baseline to understand challenges within the field. This review will also address some existing ideas on characteristics of interagency integration as well as competing ideas that other authors have proposed to address insufficient expertise in the military for stability operations. Additionally, within Appendix A will be a discussion of current US military doctrine on interagency cooperation, and Appendix B will describe how DoS specifically currently manages interagency personnel in support of military stability operations.

The challenges of interagency integration are not new; there is a large body of research addressing how bureaucracies can better integrate. For example, Jon Rosenwasser and Michael Warner propose one framework to consider the interagency system comprising two dimensions: dynamics and levels. The dynamics they propose are the functions of the underlying structures, the nature of the threat environment, a state's geostrategic position, constitutional frameworks, leadership proclivities, technology, and prevailing public management paradigms.[5] The levels at which Rosenwasser and Warner examine the interagency are the strategic, the operational, and the field.[6] Their framework—dynamics and levels—helps us consider that context truly matters. To their point, the challenges of integration can be very different, not just at each level but also considering each unique environment where integration is needed. The challenges of integrating interagency in the war zones of Iraq or Afghanistan under the Bush administration are very different than integration to address the public health crisis in Africa in 2014.

Another interagency framework to consider was described by Harvard's James Q. Wilson, author of *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. In his work, Wilson argues that

[5] Rosenwasser and Warner, "History of the Interagency Process for Foreign Relations in the United States," 12.

[6] Ibid.

government inefficiency is not due to unqualified bureaucrats or red tape but rather inherent systemic issues. Wilson uses a variety of lenses—like organization, beliefs, culture, interests, and autonomy—to assist in analysis of interagency behavior.

As Wilson indicates, organization matters: "the key difference between more and less successful bureaucracies has less to do with finances, client populations, or legal arrangements than with organizational systems."[7] The importance of organization is codified in whether or not these systems are defined and institutionalized: "If Congress wants an agency to tend to the needs of a group, it usually makes that preference clear. If it seems not to care, or some parts of Congress want an interest helped and others do not, the agency is likely to be given a lot of discretion that will then be used in a (usually vain) effort to stay out of trouble."[8] If a bureaucratic task is important, then we should see the organization and systems clearly defined. If they are not clearly defined, then the ambiguity may lead to future inefficiency, ineffectiveness, or irrelevance.

Wilson also explains that organizational beliefs are critical to understand, especially when tasks are ill defined: "Experience, professionalism, and ideology are likely to have their greatest influence when laws, rules, and circumstances do not precisely define operator tasks."[9] In a similar vein, organizational culture also influences bureaucratic and interagency performance: "Even short of occasions for major organizational change, the perceptions supplied an organizational culture sometimes can lean an official to behave not as the situation requires but as the culture expects."[10] In complex and ambiguous environments with ill-defined mission tasks, both organizational beliefs and cultures can dramatically affect performance. This fact is further complicated when multiple agencies with differing beliefs and cultures are involved.

Wilson also highlights bureaucratic interests in bureaucratic performance: "When bureaucrats are free to choose a course of action their choices will reflect the full array of incentives operating on them: some will reflect the need to manage a workload; others will reflect the expectations of workplace peers and professional colleagues elsewhere; still others may reflect their own convictions."[11]

[7] Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 23.

[8] Ibid., 88.

[9] Ibid., 70.

[10] Ibid., 110.

[11] Ibid., 88.

While we may expect an attitude of mission first, human nature very much affects bureaucratic nature; interests of both the individual and the organization may affect organizational effectiveness.

Finally, Wilson uses the lens of autonomy in examining bureaucratic performance: "The chief result of the concern for turf and autonomy is that it is extraordinarily difficult to coordinate the work of different agencies."[12] Specifically recognizing interagency coordination, "Government agencies . . . view any interagency agreement as a threat to their autonomy."[13] The problem of autonomy is especially prevalent in the realm of foreign policy. Unlike environmental policy under the Environmental Protection Agency, there are many masters of the foreign policy portfolio. As Wilson highlights, "Turf problems are large, and largely insoluble, when the government has within it dozens of agencies that make foreign policy, scores that make or affect economic policy, and countless ones that regulate business activity and enforce criminal laws."[14] The result is inherent and systemic bureaucratic infighting, rather than incentivized cooperation: "Autonomy is valued at least as much as resources, because autonomy determines the degree to which it is costly to acquire and use resources."[15] While this is especially true at the strategic and operational level, the repercussions of these turf wars are always felt at the lowest levels of agencies' respective organizations.

If we consider, however, that these challenges vary depending on what level we are analyzing, then the problem becomes increasingly complex. Executives at the strategic-political level may be more concerned about autonomy (turf) and interests, while managers and operators at the tactical level may be more influenced by culture in the organization.

Wilson's seminal work ultimately provides this analysis with insight into how bureaucratic organizations operate. Specifically, we need to understand how organizational structure, beliefs and culture, interests, and desire for autonomy will affect interagency integration into Army units. These concepts provide us a common lexicon to better understand the dynamics at play, as we look at case studies for analysis.

[12] Ibid., 192.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., 195.

[15] Ibid.

Necessary Characteristics of Interagency Cooperation

The body of literature is unclear as to the necessary characteristics of interagency cooperation at the tactical level. However, one source for insight is a draft document that has been circulated among the diplomacy, defense, and development communities. The Diplomacy, Development, and Defense Planning Group was chartered to develop products and processes to improve collaboration in planning among DoS, USAID, and DoD.[16] The *Diplomacy, Development, Defense Planning Guide* is a reference tool to help identify opportunities for coordination among the three organizations and helps articulate reforms and institutions that are being considered outside of joint doctrine. While the majority of the document is focused on the strategic and operational levels of operations for diplomacy, development, and defense interagency-planning integration, there are still certain concepts and principles that are useful to consider for tactical interagency cooperation and integration. Accordingly, integrated interagency planning is intended to create unity of purpose and effort and is based on three key concepts:

1. Unity of effort, based on four principles:
    a. A common understanding of the situation,
    b. A common vision or goals for the mission,
    c. Coordination of efforts to ensure continued coherency, and
    d. Common measures of progress and ability to change course if necessary;
2. Integrated interagency decision making; and
3. Engaging with the host nation and international partners.[17]

The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations applies these principles specifically to deconflict transformation planning with interagency partners in support of integrated USG efforts or integrated approaches, normally at the request of a chief of mission or State Department bureau.[18] While these concepts and principles are applied at the chief-of-mission level, they provide another framework of characteristics, of what successful tactical interagency cooperation looks like.

[16] USAID, DoD, and DoS, *Diplomacy, Development, Defense Planning Guide*, 4.

[17] Ibid., 38.

[18] Ibid.

Competing Ideas Addressing Insufficient Stability Expertise

This research would be remiss if it did not highlight some alternative proposed solutions to the lack of stability and reconstruction operations expertise in tactical military formations. In *Exporting Security: International Engagement Security Cooperation and the Changing Face of the Military,* Naval War College professor Derek Reveron succinctly articulates that security cooperation and stability operations are a new norm and reality for postmodern conflicts and US military operations. Recognizing previous failures of the US military to sufficiently train, organize, and resource these new mission sets, like in Iraq, Reveron discusses how to transform the military itself, to better address security cooperation and stability operations. For example, DoD and Congress have examined a variety of policy proposals in order to address this expertise gap in military formations. Since 9/11, the US military has dramatically increased the amount of culture and language training that soldiers receive.[19]

As discussed previously, interagency integration is another solution to addressing expertise gaps; but as Reveron highlights in his work, DoD is attempting to reform at a pace much faster than many interagency partners like DoS can catch up to. The result is various proposals where others have looked at simply building organic capacity within DoD, to independently conduct stability and reconstruction operations without major interagency assistance. For example, Andrew Krepinevich proposed creating forward liaison and assistance groups composed of forty-five brigades (approximately two hundred thousand personnel); military assistance group headquarters of three hundred to three thousand personnel; security training and equipping groups of two thousand to three thousand personnel; and civil operations, reconstruction, and development support groups of four thousand to five thousand troops.[20] On a similar model, the Congressional Research Service listed an option to create five divisions specifically tasked with and organized around stability and reconstruction operations.[21] John Nagl—a retired lieutenant colonel, counterinsurgency expert, and former president of the Center for a New American Security—proposed a permanent twenty thousand–member advisory corps.[22]

[19] Reveron, *Exporting Security*, 154.

[20] Ibid., 159.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

While these proposals may seem unrealistic in today's resource-constrained environment, the Army is currently looking at smaller-scale versions of them. In February 2018 the US Army formally activated the first of six security force assistance brigades (SFABs) whose core mission will be to conduct security cooperation activities for combatant commands.[23] These units will be smaller than regular BCTs, and they will be primarily manned by officers and senior noncommissioned officers trained specifically for advise-and-assist missions.

Building independent capacity within DoD is certainly a solution to the military's stability operations capability gap. However, the problems with these proposals include the cost, the difficulty in building expertise in young officers and noncommissioned officers that is built over a lengthy career in the interagency, the longevity and stability of these soldiers in these units, the time required for these units to be available, and the loss of conventional combat operations expertise of these new units. For these reasons, the ideas presented within this report seek a more realistic solution, to incorporate already existing interagency expertise into tactical military formations.

Analytical Model

In order to assess whether interagency integration was essential to tactical-mission success, each case study conducts a qualitative analysis of three variables:

1. Internal interagency assessments,
2. Third-party assessments, and
3. Stability-operations outputs at the tactical level, or measures of effectiveness (e.g., villages secured, security cooperation objectives completed, new Ebola patients).

A subjective qualitative assessment will be made on each case study and be presented at the conclusion of each analysis (see Table 1).

[23] US Army, "1st SFAB hosts activation ceremony; Heraldry announced."

Table 1: Program—Primary Research Question Analysis (Source: created by author)

Case study	Interagency integration present?	Failure or success?	Results linked to interagency integration?
RAF	*No*	*Major challenges present*	*Yes*
Ebola	*Yes*	*Success*	*Yes*

In order to answer the secondary research question (i.e., in cases where interagency integration was essential for tactical-mission success, what were its primary characteristics?), a cross-sectional analysis (Table 2) will be utilized to engender conclusions on how interagency integration was or was not applied in each case study across doctrine, organization, training, and policy. These will be used to determine characteristics for better interagency integration in future recommendations.

Table 2: Program—Analytical Lens

Program	Doctrine	Organization	Training	Policy	Result
RAF					
Ebola					

The resulting analysis from these historical cases will subsequently aid in answering whether interagency cooperation should be institutionalized at a more integrated and effective rate in tactical-level stability operations. Additionally, if so, how should we amend our doctrine, organization, training, and policy in order to facilitate this change?

Case Studies

Case Study 1: Africa Command Regionally Aligned Forces

In 2013 US AFRICOM became the first combatant command to be allocated an Army regionally aligned BCT. According to the Army,

> Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) is the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army's vision for providing combatant commanders with versatile, responsive, and consistently available Army forces. Regionally Aligned Forces will meet combatant commanders' requirements for units and capabilities to support operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities.[24]

The RAF entailed sending small teams, often platoon- or squad-size elements, across the entire African continent in a variety of multilateral, nonkinetic, security cooperation activities.

AFRICOM and its subordinate command, US Army Africa (USARAF), partner with nations throughout the African continent through a variety of joint security cooperation efforts. Security cooperation covers a broad set of activities that promote US interests, build partner nations' capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, and provides US forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.[25] Some examples of security cooperation activities include sending military liaison teams, conducting seminars and conferences, and training and equipping partner nations' security forces.[26]

In order to prioritize security cooperation activities throughout the continent, AFRICOM develops a campaign plan, which is a joint, multiyear plan that reflects a strategy to achieve the commander's desired end states for the region. The majority of Army security cooperation activities are planned, in line with the campaign, by AFRICOM HQ in Stuttgart, Germany, and USARAF in Vicenza, Italy.[27] Planning for security cooperation involves multiple stakeholders, including each of the service component commands, AFRICOM's special-operations component, the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, program

[24] US Army, "Regionally Aligned Forces."

[25] US Government Accountability Office, *Regionally Aligned Forces*, 4.

[26] Ibid., 4.

[27] Ibid., 8.

managers responsible for identifying resources to support security cooperation activities, and the Offices of Security Cooperation at US embassies in Africa.[28]

Both AFRICOM and USARAF generate security cooperation activities through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms. AFRICOM leads interagency conferences, which brings together planners from a variety of stakeholders, to discuss theater- and country-level objectives, resources, and supporting activities.[29] AFRICOM also hosts country-level meetings in order to further develop country plans, especially those countries with a large number of engagements.[30] Unfortunately, due to the sheer number of countries in AFRICOM's area of responsibility, it is logistically difficult to hold these individual country meetings annually, but it is the responsibility for each embassy to review their country plan to ensure that DoD objectives and activities are aligned with and in support of DoS objectives and plans.[31] Ultimately, the Office of Security Cooperation aligned with each individual embassy (approximately thirty-eight nations) generates many of the initial concepts for security cooperation activities that are subsequently tasked by USARAF to tactical units.[32]

In 2013 AFRICOM became the first geographic combatant command to receive an Army RAF—specifically, a BCT to primarily support theater security cooperation.[33] Prior to the RAF concept, AFRICOM and its subordinate command, USARAF, would allocate units to support approved security cooperation activities through DoD's standard processes for requesting forces. This process required USARAF to separately request forces for each individual activity, a lengthy bureaucratic process that was slow and unpredictable, because each request would compete with requests from other geographic combatant commands and other strategic priorities.[34] The RAF concept, conversely, sought to allocate an entire BCT to AFRICOM untied to individual specific security cooperation activities. The RAF construct allowed AFRICOM to more efficiently and predictably access Army brigade capabilities for the duration of an RAF

[28] Ibid., 13.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., 14.

[31] Ibid., 14.

[32] Ibid., 6, 14.

[33] Ibid., 1.

[34] Ibid., 6–7.

deployment to support multiple (and last-minute-emerging) security cooperation activities without having to submit new requests.[35] At its most fundamental level, RAF is a troop-delivery platform designed to provide habitually aligned forces quickly to combatant commanders.[36] Hopefully, over time regional and cultural expertise will be built within these units through habitual relationships with their respective regions.

Between 2013 and 2015, four BCTs have been allocated to AFRICOM:

2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from April 2013 to June 2014;
4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from June 2014 to February 2015;
4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division from February 2015 to October 2015;
2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division from October 2015 through 2016.[37]

These units primarily conducted security cooperation activities in five categories: (1) security assistance; (2) combined exercises; (3) military contacts; (4) information sharing, intelligence cooperation; and (5) humanitarian assistance.[38] Figure 1 shows some examples of the different security cooperation activities that 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry; 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry; and 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, conducted during their RAF rotations.

Each of the allocated brigades also were tasked with security and crisis response missions under the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, which required each brigade to deploy a battalion task force to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti for the duration of its alignment.[39] These battalion task forces conducted some security cooperation activities in support of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa and other peacekeeping support operations.[40]

[35] Ibid., 2.

[36] Morse, "Regionally Aligned Forces," 1.

[37] US Government Accountability Office, *Regionally Aligned Forces*, 8.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid., 9.

[40] Ibid.

Figure 1: Example AFRICOM RAF Security Cooperation Activities (Source: US Government Accountability Office, Regionally Aligned Forces*, 55)*



Regionally Aligned Forces Interagency Problems

Appendix A describes the state of current Army doctrine for interagency integration. In short, Army doctrine currently does not integrate interagency cooperation at the BCT level. Interagency coordination primarily occurs within civil-military operational centers (CMOCs) at the division, corps, or joint task force (JTF) HQ. In the specific case of the RAF BCT, there is no parent division or corps HQ that helps support day-to-day operations. The RAF BCT reports to USARAF, the army service component command, under AFRICOM, which attempts to coordinate interagency cooperation under their joint interagency coordination group (JIACG). The impact is an interagency apparatus designed for the operational and

strategic levels unaccustomed to managing and supporting the day-to-day operations of tactical units in an area of operations.

In 2015 the National Defense Authorization Act directed the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess DoD's efforts to plan for and employ these brigades to Africa.[41] In August 2015 GAO released their findings, and it concluded there was much room for improvement, especially in interagency coordination. The report highlighted,

> U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) identifies and synchronizes security cooperation activities through various planning processes, but the brigades allocated to AFRICOM sometimes lack key information about these activities. The brigades are tasked to conduct many of these activities, but they sometimes lack timely and complete information about the activities, such as activity objectives, which can compromise their effectiveness. While personnel from USARAF and the Offices of Security Cooperation coordinate informally, they do not always have a shared understanding of the activity objectives or involve the brigades in planning. Furthermore, USARAF does not have a formal mechanism that includes both the Offices of Security Cooperation and the brigades to shape activities and address information gaps. As a result, the brigades' ability to conduct activities may be challenged, and the resources invested may not have the anticipated effect.[42]

The communication issues that the report illustrates are a direct result of either ineffective or nonexistent mechanisms to coordinate between US embassies, defense attachés, offices of security cooperation at each country, USARAF, and ultimately the RAF BCT itself. For example, according to GAO, USARAF officials try to provide task orders to the BCT ninety days in advance of each activity in order to guide their preparation and training.[43] Task orders identify each security activity's key details, task, purpose, and desired end state.[44] The brigades reported that often the task orders were provided late and sometimes not at all—one brigade reported receiving their task order from a third-party channel, five days after arriving in country.[45]

The result of these communication problems and lack of synchronization are RAF soldiers who are unprepared or untrained to meet the activity objectives, wasted USG resources, or, worse, DoD and DoS

[41] Ibid., 1.

[42] Ibid., 1.

[43] Ibid., 17.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

not achieving their regional objectives and end states. For example, one RAF unit was tasked by USARAF to send mechanics to teach a mechanic course; however, USARAF did not communicate what type of equipment they would train on. The US soldiers arrived in country and ultimately canceled training because they were unfamiliar with the equipment the host-nation country expected them to be educated on.[46]

In another example, incomplete critical information about host-nation security force's capabilities affected mission success. During their initial planning, the RAF expected that the host-nation forces already had a basic competency and familiarization with their artillery systems. Subsequently, the RAF brigade planned and prepared for a training course in advanced artillery techniques. Upon arrival, however, they assessed that basic-level instruction for the host-nation soldiers was needed, which completely undermined all the planned exercises with the host-nation forces.[47]

Untimely or incomplete information is certainly not the sole responsibility of the USARAF staff, who are planning multiple activities for a continent at once. The information the RAF units need is often held within dozens of offices of security cooperation and embassies across the continent. However, while offices of security cooperation and USARAF do informally contact one other, they do not consistently and formally meet to discuss upcoming activities—furthermore, the brigades are rarely involved in these informal conversations.[48]

The brigades themselves also bear some responsibility, but often they are unaware that they have incomplete information before deploying. Likewise, they are ill equipped or restricted from contacting their applicable Office of Security Cooperation, embassy, or even USARAF, because they do not have approval for direct liaison.[49] Figure 2 illustrates the fragmented coordination between the RAF BCT, USARAF, and the offices of security cooperation.

[46] Ibid., 18.

[47] Ibid., 19.

[48] Ibid., 21.

[49] Ibid., 18.

Figure 2: AFRICOM's Fragmented Coordination (Source: US Government Accountability Office, Regionally Aligned Forces*, 22)*



Interagency confusion and inefficiencies have even escalated to cases where soldiers in the brigades experienced challenges and delays in obtaining official passports. Despite USARAF and RAF BCTs supporting DoS coordinated and approved security cooperation activities, DoS passport procedures have denied many soldiers from deploying.[50] The concept of RAF was always to provide a flexible pool of soldiers for the combatant command to draw from, in order to support sometimes late notice security cooperation activities. As a result, brigades often put in blanket official passport requests for anyone with the potential to deploy in support of RAF activities, with the understanding that some soldiers may not use these official passports, depending on the combatant command needs. This practice runs counter to DoS procedures, and subsequently DoS has more-stringent vetting procedures for RAF passport requests. Due to these coordination problems, AFRICOM RAF brigades have reported that several of their activities were canceled or delayed because some personnel could not obtain an official passport or visa; similarly,

[50] Ibid., 38.

in some instances, the soldier best suited for an activity did not deploy, forcing personnel that only met the basic skill and capability requirements to deploy in their stead because they had a passport.[51]

Measuring the Effectiveness of Regionally Aligned Forces

There are many points of failure for the RAF and USARAF's communication problems. Certainly USARAF could have devoted more time to clearly understanding each country's security cooperation activity objectives and training plans. This information could have also been communicated to the RAF brigade. Likewise, the individual embassies and security cooperation offices could have more clearly ensured that their security cooperation activities were more fully articulated to USARAF. The RAF BCT itself could submit requests for information through USARAF, but that would be conditioned on the RAF BCT knowing in the first place that they lack complete or accurate information.

Acknowledging the geographic dispersion of these units and the many other planning and mission requirements that the USARAF staff is responsible for, it is understandable that a complete and detailed awareness of each security cooperation activity was not communicated to the RAF planners. The results, however, are clear—wherever the responsibility for the ineffective coordination falls, a lack of interagency synchronization, cooperation, and potentially integration led to a less-than-optimal outcome for AFRICOM, DoD, and DoS's security cooperation objectives within the region.

Using Wilson's framework of analysis for the RAF case, we see that organizational structure and a desire for autonomy both played a role in undermining interagency coordination and mission success. Organizational structure and a lack of authority (caused by USARAF's desire for autonomy) of the RAF BCT, which prevented any interagency liaison officers (LNOs) at the BCT level, resulted in the RAF BCT from directly coordinating with their embassy counterparts. Likewise, USARAF's own organizational structure of an overburdened staff (who logistically did not have time to regularly coordinate with each embassy), as well as relying on informal rather than formal mechanisms of coordination, resulted in insufficient coordination. All these challenges can similarly be analyzed through the DOTMLPF-P lens of doctrine, organization, training, and policy (see Table 3).

The 2015 GAO report recommends that AFRICOM develop formal mechanisms—such as regularly scheduled, country-specific meetings between all parties involved—to review and discuss upcoming security cooperation activities; GAO proposes increasing the number of LNOs embedded at USARAF in

[51] Ibid.

order to achieve this.[52] However, another potential recommendation could be allowing and empowering the RAF BCT itself to synchronize and coordinate across the interagency. What would the result be if each RAF BCT (currently aligned with each geographic command) had a DoS embed in its staff or the authorities and mechanisms to reach out to each embassy or security cooperation itself to establish a direct line of communication? A DoS embed or authority for direct liaison would serve several functions: reduce communication and staff channels, improve timeliness of information flows, allow the RAF to better tailor their training and operations to the unique need of each security cooperation activity. Likewise, a DoS-specific embed could assist the RAF commander in tailoring the regional and cultural training to the unique area of operations that the RAF is deploying to. Finally, a DoS embed could also better validate and expedite RAF passport requests through DoS.

Summary Analysis of Regionally Aligned Forces Case Study

Table 3: DOTMLPF-P Analysis of RAF Interagency Case Study (Source: created by author)

Program—analytical lens	Doctrine	Organization	Training	Policy	Result
RAF	(-) Army doctrine did not support interagency coordination for unit	(-) No formalized mechanisms were in place for coordination-synchronization to occur at BCT level with interagency partners. (-) Even at levels where interagency could occur, lack of formal mechanisms like synchronization conferences decreased effectiveness of RAF program.	(+) Familiarization of interagency partners was conducted, which added value once in country. (-) Lack of interagency coordination led to inefficient training and training management for security cooperation tasks.	(-) The BCT was not empowered to directly liaison with the embassy and interagency partners.	(-) Security cooperation goals were not efficiently met in many cases or were canceled in several circumstances due to lack of interagency coordination.

[52] Ibid., 27.

Case Study 2: US Response to Ebola in West Africa

International Community Rallies for Action

On March 13, 2014, the Guinean Ministry of Health issued an alert concerning an unidentified disease with symptoms of hemorrhagic fever, later to be confirmed as Ebola.[53] On March 23, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced the Ebola outbreak in Guinea, and days later Sierra Leone and Liberia also confirmed possible cases of the disease.[54] Previously, no cases of Ebola had ever been recorded in West Africa; all three governments had limited to no experience in identifying or containing the disease.[55] Communities were quarantined, schools were shut down, and military forces were deployed to contain the spread of the virus. Table 4 shows the cumulative rapid spread of the Ebola disease in all three countries during this time period. Figure 3 shows these cases geographically around the time of US intervention.

Table 4: Cumulative Reported Ebola Cases: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa")



[53] USAID et al., "International Ebola Response and Preparedness," 1.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

Figure 3: Ebola Cumulative Incidence—West Africa, September 20, 2014 (Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa")



On August 8, 2014, WHO had declared the Ebola epidemic in West Africa a public health emergency of international concern.[56] By September 18, 2014, the UN Security Council called for assistance and declared the Ebola outbreak a "threat to international security and peace."[57] The USG declared that it would take the lead role in Liberia; the United Kingdom, in Sierra Leone; and France, in Guinea.[58]

The USG applied a whole-of-government approach to the Liberian Ebola response. USAID was designated as the lead federal agency to manage and coordinate the US effort; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention led the medical and public health component; DoS had responsibility for advancing related diplomatic efforts; and DoD, under Operation United Assistance, began direct support

[56] European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, "Ebola Outbreak in West Africa (2013-2016)."

[57] USAID et al., "International Ebola Response and Preparedness," 36–37.

[58] Ibid., 37.

to civilian-led response efforts.[59] These federal agencies sought to advance four primary goals outlined in the US global Ebola strategy:

1. Controlling the outbreak;
2. Mitigating second-order impacts;
3. Establishing coherent leadership and operations; and
4. Advancing global-health security.[60]

Ebola: A Model for Interagency

As soon as President Barack Obama authorized a US response, it was a whole-of-government operation. The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance is the office within USAID responsible for providing emergency, nonfood humanitarian assistance in response to international crises and disasters. They are responsible for international disaster risk reduction, resilience, and coordination efforts and also for devising, coordinating, and implementing strategies for responding to disasters.[61] When the size or scope of the disaster warrants it, the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance has the capability to deploy a disaster assistance response team (DART) globally.[62] The twenty-eight-person DART consisted of humanitarian experts and technical advisors—from USAID, Centers for Disease Control, DoD, the US Department of Health and Human Services, and the US Forest Service—who were to assess the situation firsthand, identify the most urgent needs, and coordinate the USG response.[63] The DART was the first US entity on the ground in Liberia, coordinating the response prior to the arrival of follow-on forces and agencies.

Operations and coordination centers were key to coordinating the interagency, interorganizational, and intergovernmental response. The Centers for Disease Control and USAID utilized a model called the Incident Command System, which is designed to provide effective and efficient incident management by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications command

[59] Ibid., 3.

[60] Ibid., 70–71.

[61] Ibid., 73.

[62] Ibid.

[63] White House, "Fact Sheet."

efforts within a common organizational structure.[64] Interim national Ebola operations centers were initially set up in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Mali to establish national emergency management programs for the Ebola response.[65] The DART, USAID, and Centers for Disease Control served a vital role in facilitating the creation of these coordination centers. Eventually, the government of Liberia designated the Liberian Ministry of Health (MoH) to run and coordinate a national center called the National Ebola Coordination Center (NECC). Other coordination centers would also take root to manage more specific efforts, such as the UN mission.

The NECC would serve a critical function of coordinating the Ebola response from the wide-ranging agencies, organizations, and governments responding to the crisis in Liberia. As Lieutenant Colonel Ross Lightsey, the Operation United Assistance J-9, or civil-military operations section, indicated in a recent article, "Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the center of gravity where collective and collaborative decisions were made was within the NECC. . . . It cannot be stressed enough that the NECC was the most central location and source of information and was where major cooperation and decision making occurred. If it had not been developed and implemented by the Liberian Ministry of Health (MoH), the opportunity for organizational collaboration would have been hard pressed for success."[66]

Measuring the Effectiveness of Interagency Integration during the Ebola Crisis

In the September 16, 2014, opening order, USARAF was designated as a joint forces command (JFC) HQ to oversee the military mission and the three thousand soldiers dedicated to the Ebola response. In direct support of USAID and its DART, the JFC was given the mission to construct seventeen Ebola treatment units.[67] USARAF would conduct the initial planning and theater opening (facilitating the logistics of moving troops into the region), but the JFC role would eventually be turned over to the 101st Airborne Division, by October 25, 2014.[68]

Unfortunately, not everything went smoothly for the 101st Airborne Division as they assumed the JFC role. As Major General Gary Volesky, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, noted in a Center for

[64] USAID et al., "International Ebola Response and Preparedness," 39.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Lightsey, "Fighting Ebola."

[67] Center for Army Lessons Learned, *101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Operation United Assistance*, iv, 7.

[68] Ibid., 5.

Army Lessons Learned interview, "Few of the 101st Division staff members possessed experience in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions. . . . Fortunately, the alert to prepare to deploy occurred before the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) were conducted. The program was flexible and adapted academics to meet the division's requirements by focusing on Unified Action Partners (UAPs) and HA/DR."[69] MCTP is a staff training program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where brigade, division, and corps staffs are tested in their processes and systems in a simulated operational environment. Lightsey, the J-9, was able to develop a two-day interagency academics seminar in conjunction with MCTP to bring together USAID, the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, Centers for Disease Control, DoS, UN, the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease, the US Department of Health and Human Services, and the US National Institutes of Health.[70] Had it not been for this MCTP training opportunity immediately prior to the 101st's deployment, their staff would have gone into Liberia with a tremendous capability gap in understanding the nuances of the HA/DR operation among interagency partners. These gaps would have required more on-the-job learning rather than being ready to immediately execute their tasks once in country.

When the 101st Airborne Division arrived, the J-9 and the commander made a conscious decision to not establish a CMOC. It was the belief of the 101st Airborne, that the NECC served as a type of national level CMOC and if the 101st had established their own, it would have only added to coordination confusion.[71] It was clear to the 101st Airborne, however, that the NECC had room for improvement: "Although more than 120 multinational organizations worked within the NECC, the lack of managerial oversight and prioritization was apparent."[72] In order to better facilitate coordination, cooperation, and synchronization, the 101st J-2, intelligence section, embedded analysts to work with the international organizations and utilize their skills of pattern and trend analysis, to help the NECC and partner organizations better understand the situation and the spread of the Ebola virus. Similarly, the J-9 section emplaced several LNOs within the NECC and other coordination centers to better synchronize their operations and situational understanding. As a later after action report (AAR) indicated, "The synergy

[69] Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater*, 5-6.

[70] Lightsey, "Fighting Ebola."

[71] Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater*, 40–41.

[72] Center for Army Lessons Learned, *101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) Operation United Assistance*, 23.

created by the constant monitoring and sharing of information by the LNOs was essential to successful mission command in Liberia."[73]

The need for interagency, interorganizational, and intergovernmental cooperation proved critical throughout the operation. As the logistics officers for the JFC quickly realized, in an immature theater (one where US forces have not been operating for an extended period), it is very difficult to quickly move in large amounts of personnel and equipment: "A majority of nations worldwide are very similar to Liberia in that these nations have limited infrastructure (airports, seaports, and road networks) and few governmental assets (law enforcement, healthcare, informational/educational workforces) to cope with large scale HA/DR events. HA/DR events tend to overwhelm the infrastructures and systems necessary to combat those very events. Logistic support is central to HA/DR. Planning, anticipating, forecasting, coordinating, and integrating within ASCCs [Army service component command] must include the whole of the strategic community; the DLA, USTRANSCOM, DoS, U.S. Embassies, USAID, UN, international participants, non-governmental organizations, and others within the JOA [joint operations area] are essential to progress and success."[74]

A similar realization of the critical importance of interagency cooperation was realized by the officers tasked to establish an Ebola training center in the capital of Monrovia. The military was required to build a training center capable of training up to five hundred health-care workers per week. Staffed by the USARAF G-3 Training Team, the team consisted of one US Army lieutenant colonel, one major, and one sergeant major. At a loss in where to start, they coordinated with the USARAF surgeon cell to better understand the requirement. The command surgeon began interacting with MoH, USAID, and WHO and discovered that there was an existing training center providing the training capability requested by DoD. The problem, however, was that the center did not have the resources to expand the training or export it to another location.[75] The G-3 team had sufficient time to rewrite their plan to incorporate the WHO training facility and simply provide WHO with the needed resources to adapt their curriculum and additional staff to meet the requirements for a larger training center. In this case, coordinating with NGOs and civil authorities to develop a civic assistance plan proved critical to mission success. Without the

[73] Ibid., 34.

[74] Ibid., 18.

[75] Ibid., 22.

expertise of WHO and MoH, the G-3 Training Team most likely would have created a suboptimal, redundant, and less efficient solution.

What if the command surgeon, in this previous example, did not have the time or ability to informally network with USAID, MoH, and WHO? The whole intent of a functioning CMOC or similar coordination center is to rely less on informal networking and instead institutionalize systems that can help fill these critical coordination gaps with other nonmilitary partners. In the AAR, the G-3 Training Team recommended that, in the short term, the staff should request NGO LNO representation to participate in staff humanitarian assistance planning and that, in the long term, the USARAF staff should include NGO representation or a USAID LNO to aid in early stages of force projection operations.[76] Embedded partners on staffs are the type of interagency integration reform that can dramatically improve mission effectiveness in the future.

Another problem the 101st Airborne Division faced in interagency cooperation was on what systems they were communicating on. The USARAF commander, Major General Darryl Williams, quickly grasped the reality that unity of effort among the many different partners on the ground could only happen if USARAF shared information on unclassified networks, rather than the classified networks their staff was accustomed to.[77] The transition to unclassified networks became a severe challenge for a staff dependent on their classified army command and intelligence information systems. The 101st Airborne was simply unprepared, especially in the austere environment of Liberia, to establish an effective knowledge-management process to not only give network access to interagency and interorganizational partners but also share information across the network.[78]

A solution for the 101st Airborne Division was to take over AFRICOM's All Partner Access Network, originally intended to provide information on exercises and HA/DR conferences.[79] AFRICOM's All Partner Access Network suddenly became a real-time collaboration tool to share information and increase situational awareness. If the AFRICOM All Partner Access Network solution had not existed, the 101st Airborne Division would have had to generate another knowledge-management and information solution quickly. The need to share information primarily across unclassified networks will continue to be a

[76] Ibid., 23.

[77] Ibid., 33.

[78] Ibid., 38.

[79] Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation United Assistance Setting the Theater*, 7.

challenge for future HA/DR missions that are whole-of-government operations. Future JFCs, divisions, and even brigades will need to be trained on and have available the technology to quickly switch from classified military systems to an unclassified information environment conducive to greater interagency, interorganizational, and intergovernmental information sharing.

The final challenge for the 101st Airborne was that of organizational culture. According to the AARs, "the U.S. Army has developed a Warfighter mentality that did not serve USARAF personnel well in a permissive environment (i.e. sovereign nation). This caused friction and put into motion unnecessary assets, units, and capabilities."[80] The AAR is referring to an Army unaccustomed to being subordinate to civilian organizations, other governments, and other government agencies in an area of operations. These other organizations often do not have clearly defined decision-making processes, which can be challenging to military organizations that are accustomed to making decisions and acting quickly.[81] Rather than having these differing organizational cultures as points of friction, the military should learn how to support civilian leadership, utilizing their planning and logistical strengths without taking over the process.[82] These cultural friction points were a challenge for the 101st, accustomed to quickly solving problems, but eased with time through greater interagency exposure and coordination.

As we look at the Ebola case study, by most accounts a successful example of whole-of-government interagency coordination, there are a few key questions that arise. Would the 101st Airborne Division have been as successful if the DART element and USAID had not helped the government of Liberia develop the NECC? The NECC was critical to the success, and USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division made an excellent decision to utilize it as its primary CMOC. But in the absence of the NECC, was the 101st Airborne Division prepared or equipped to run or facilitate its own CMOC that could serve as an adequate coordination center for the entire region or country? Based on the level of experience of the staff and the organizational culture of the 101st Airborne Division, it is likely that their CMOC would have been less effective. In future HA/DR mission sets, the host nation, international organizations, and interagency partners may not have the capabilities to develop such a robust coordination structure, especially in war zones with limited access.

[80] Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation United Assistance*, 4.

[81] Ibid., 7.

[82] Ibid.

From a doctrinal perspective, both USARAF and the 101st Airborne Division were empowered to host or integrate into a CMOC structure. The J-9 and J-2 both had adequate personnel to provide LNOs to make the system work. However, if a BCT is required (on a much smaller scale) to integrate with interagency partners, would they have the expertise or capacity to coordinate such an effort? Most likely, a BCT would not have the capacity to integrate interagency at their provincial, rather than national, level.

Summary Analysis of Ebola Case Study

Table 5: DOTMLPF-P Analysis of Ebola Case Study (Source: created by author)

Program—analytical lens	Doctrine	Organization	Training	Policy	Result
Ebola	(+) Both JFC- and division-level doctrine support interagency coordination through a CMOC function.	(+) Sufficient personnel were present in the J-9 and J-2 sections to provide sufficient LNOs at coordination centers throughout the country. (-) There existed a lack of technological solutions; lack of planning on how to conduct operations and planning primarily on unclassified networks; difficulty to provide other partners with network access.	(-) Staff lacked expertise in the HA/DR mission set and lacked interagency experience. MCTP helped to alleviate this problem, but if it had not been scheduled in advance, the division would have been at a disadvantage.	(+) From the onset the Ebola response was a whole-of-government operation. DoD and the JFC were a supporting command to USAID. This led to better understanding of support relationships and strengthened interagency cooperation.	(+) While there were initial issues that were resolved, effective interagency cooperation was a critical factor in mission success, halting the spread of Ebola in Liberia.

Case Study Summaries

The RAF case study illustrated that particularly in the AFRICOM theater, US Army brigades had difficulty accomplishing their mission because of a lack of interagency integration. This observation leads us to believe that interagency integration very likely is essential to RAF mission success. Specifically, due to

interagency communication problems between DoD and DoS, RAF soldiers were often unprepared and sometimes untrained or unable to deploy.

In the case of Ebola, while initial integration difficulties arose, interagency integration proved critical to the 101st Airborne's success in halting the spread of Ebola in Liberia. The Ebola case study is of particular value because it provides a good example where interagency integration occurred outside of US Army doctrinal interagency institutions. The 101st Airborne Division made a conscious decision to forgo a CMOC and instead utilized the DARTs and Liberia's NECC constructs.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The primary research question of this report was: In past cases in which the United States has conducted stability operations, has interagency integration been essential to tactical mission success? In order to answer this question, two case studies were examined:

1. RAF in Africa from 2013 to 2015; and
2. the US response to the Ebola pandemic in West Africa in 2014.

Each case study utilized a qualitative analysis of three variables: internal interagency assessments, third-party academic assessments, and measures of operational effectiveness in order to ascertain whether interagency integration was essential for tactical mission success (or failure).

Additionally, a DOTMLPF-P framework focusing on doctrine, organization, training, and policy was used to identify characteristics essential for success (or failure).

Prior to beginning this research report, the initial hypothesis, that interagency integration was essential for tactical-mission success, was based on observations that tactical-level Army units (BCTs and below) were required to conduct complex stability operations without the necessary expertise that interagency partners could provide to military formations. While this remains true, through the analysis of these case studies, a more nuanced conclusion emerges.

The first observation is that there are real challenges to managing both conventional operations and stability operations. As currently structured, BCT staffs do not have adequate apparatuses to manage large interagency inputs. Similarly, as the Ebola case study shows, there is an inexperience even in division staffs to work with the interagency. This problem is only further amplified at the BCT level. Tactical staffs are often better equipped to focus separately either on warfighting tasks or on stability tasks.

Instead of building a BCT staff to manage both, it may be better to augment a more robust CMOC structure to manage interagency coordination separately from BCT warfighting tasks. In future operations it may be better to rely on CMOC structures but integrate them solely with division or corps staffs, so that commanders can include interagency expertise aligned with larger operational objectives while still allowing BCTs to focus solely on tactical tasks.

The second observation is that integrated interagency organizations must not ignore the challenge of finding civilian agency capacity to fill positions. Despite USARAF or AFRICOM including interagency integration at their HQ, much of that interagency experience could not filter down to lower levels like in the RAF brigade because the interagency often lacks personnel to embed across tactical

formations. Similarly, there is a lack of opportunities for interagency embeds to train with military formations. The 101st Airborne Division was only able to host interagency training during their MCTP academics and lacked regular interagency touchpoints during other training despite their role as a deployable JTF HQ.

The third observation is that interagency integration can occur outside of DoD managing the process. An early idea during this research was how to reform DoD toward a more comprehensive approach of interagency integration like the joint reforms of the 1980s under Goldwater-Nichols. However, cases like the Ebola response show that DoD attempting to exercise command of interagency integration can also have the potential to make matters worse, through an overt militarization of the interagency dynamics.

As the Ebola case study highlights, if the 101st Airborne Division chose to build a CMOC, it would have only confused the already complicated interagency structure in Liberia. The 101st Airborne made an important and excellent decision to utilize the NECC, which the USAID DART helped to build prior to the arrival of the 101st Airborne and JFC. The interagency community, resourced under the DART, had the capacity and expertise to build institutionalized mechanisms for DoD to incorporate itself into. Commanders need to have an awareness of when to utilize these other mechanisms, rather than duplicating them on their own simply because DoD may be resourced to do so and doctrine may call for it.

Finally, interagency integration is not a panacea. Interagency integration is necessary but not sufficient for tactical-mission success in stability operations. An integrated interagency element must also have talent, capacity, and the organizational and reporting structures to nest and synchronize with operational and strategic objectives. Despite AFRICOM's interagency integration, bureaucratic obstacles still limited the value interagency integration provided to the tactical force.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on an analysis of the case study DOTMLPF-P characteristics for successful integration. Specifically, recommendations will focus on the doctrine, organization, training, and policy variables.

Doctrine: Update Military Doctrine on Interagency Tools

The JIACGs and CMOCs may be the primary interagency tools for DoD as a lead agency, but as the military response to the Ebola epidemic has shown, DoD needs to be adaptable to other interagency integration systems. Commanders need guidance on when to appropriately apply DoD interagency coordination tools like a CMOC, when to utilize existing civilian systems, or how to best apply their own J-9 and S-9 civil affairs assets to augment existing civilian assets. For RAF units and future large-scale stability responses like the Ebola response, it is more likely that DoD will utilize other means of interagency integration, like the DART and NECC coordination systems, UN coordination centers, or ad hoc groups. Current joint doctrine like JP 3-08 and Army doctrine like Field Manual 3-07 do not reflect these other means of non-DoD-focused interagency coordination, nor do they give guidance in the variables and principles that commanders should utilize in understanding how to choose which system is more appropriate or how to augment existing interagency coordination systems.

Organization: Reform the Civil-Military Operations Center

When BCTs, divisions, and corps are required to lead or facilitate interagency integration, the CMOC is not sufficiently equipped. As shown during the 101st Airborne Division's experiences with the Ebola epidemic, they were not prepared to provide Internet access or knowledge-management tools for the range of interagency and NGO partners in the Ebola response. The DART and MoH's NECC provided the necessary institutions; but in a more denied environment where DoD is the lead agency, the CMOC may need to provide the necessary unclassified infrastructure to run a full coordination center. An immature theater of operations does not have the network and technology architecture to which the military is accustomed and which they utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the CMOC is the primary interagency coordination tool, then it needs to be resourced with the technology packages to serve this function.

Commanders should train at combat training centers with the J-9s and S-9s augmented with civil affairs soldiers and utilize their CMOCs. If the first time a tactical commander uses a CMOC is while deployed, he or she will be unaccustomed to using their CMOC properly, comfortably coordinating with interagency through it, and utilizing interagency partners in the staff-planning processes. This is especially the case for BCT commanders, who do not regularly interact with CMOCs or S-9s in their home station organic task organization.

Additionally, CMOCs that are viewed more as "meeting places" for civilian partners will struggle to integrate interagency partners into larger campaign plans and operational planning systems. The J-9

and S-9 and supporting staff officers should be empowered to integrate their civilian partners into other staff sections if necessary, to ensure unity of effort with other military and strategic efforts.

Training: Improve Interagency Training within the Military

As illustrated in the Ebola and RAF case studies, the Army has a deficiency in training leaders and soldiers to operate in an interagency environment despite currently offered JIIM training. Operating in an interagency environment should be a required training task for all deployable soldiers, especially those in RAF units, those involved in stability missions, or those in an HQ staff. Interagency partners like DoS, USAID, USDA, and the intelligence and law enforcement communities should be invited to participate in training (especially at the combat training centers) and should help craft training objectives and training scenarios. Ideally, those interagency partners supporting organizations like USARAF would benefit from participating in training with RAF BCTs to ensure proper face-to-face coordination prior to security cooperation activities.

Staffs and headquarters should also become more familiar with including interagency partners in their planning processes. The 101st Airborne Division was able to quickly change their MCTP objectives; however if made to deploy prior to or after a conventional MCTP, they would have been at a serious disadvantage. Likewise, the 101st Airborne Division was unaccustomed to operating in a mostly unclassified environment, on programs designed to share information with interagency partners and NGOs (for example, Google Earth rather than the Command Post of the Future). RAF units, division HQ, and those conducting stability operations should train their staffs to perform their functions on tool sets designed for information sharing with non-DoD partners.

Military officials should train on being in a support role, rather than a lead role, to the interagency (similar to the Ebola case)—this will help address the military's cultural tendency of trying to run or manage the interagency rather than support and contribute to the interagency.

Policy: Build Greater Capacity for Deployable Civilians in DoS and USAID

This recommendation requires authorities outside of DoD channels. As shown in the case studies, deployable civilian interagency capacity for contingency crises continues to be a problem in stability operations. If the United States conducted another large-scale integrated interagency endeavor, DoS and USAID could not support it within their current means. Stability operations will only continue to have a perception of militarization as long as the USG does not invest in building greater capacity within DoS and

USAID to deploy civilians for stability operations. It is in the interest of DoD to seek greater funding for deployable civilian capacity in DoS and USAID; otherwise, the USG will continue to rely heavily on DoD as the only organization capable of stability operations, with or without development expertise.

Recommendations for Future Research

This research was limited by its case studies; interagency integration certainly is not limited to the two cases presented. The State Partnership Program, interagency cooperation within the counterterrorism community, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq, defense support to civil authorities, intelligence cooperation initiatives, all provide good lenses for other observations on characteristics needed in interagency integration and cooperation at the tactical level.

Additionally, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to reform DoD to better integrate jointness across the military. Many policy experts advocate for twenty-first-century reforms that legislate a similar restructuring of DoD to incorporate the interagency. Examining proposals for "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" reforms were outside the scope of this research; however, these cases provide an interesting analysis of principles to consider if larger Beyond Goldwater-Nichols types of reforms become a political reality.

Finally, this thesis did not examine the impacts of education of personnel in the DOTMLPF-P characteristics for more effective integration of interagency cooperation. Education at the many professional military education schools—such as officer basic courses, captains career course, intermediate-level education, and advanced noncommissioned officer courses—represents a large amount of time and interface with the force to influence greater interagency familiarization and coordination. Affecting the military education system to address interagency integration challenges is worthy of its own independent study to understand how and where education changes can best impact interagency integration.

Closing Thoughts

The discussion about bureaucracy began with a quote from Harold Seidman, an American political scientist famous for his classic work in government and public administration called *Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization*. In it he described the quest for government coordination

as the twentieth-century equivalent of the medieval search for the philosopher's stone.[83] His point was that the inherent nature of bureaucracies runs counter to effective coordination. There is a lot of truth to this observation, but it should not prevent us from seeking to improve the current environment, especially when integration of interagency and DoD is not just an exercise of public administration interest but rather a means to prevent the loss of lives overseas and accomplish vital American national interests and objectives.

The US military is coming out of more than a decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that reached unprecedented levels of interagency integration for modern operations. An entire generation of young military officers and their foreign service officer peers understand the need, but this expertise and desire for reform can quickly be lost as a new generation of soldiers and public servants, unaccustomed to working in an integrated interagency environment, fills its ranks. The time for reform is now, while the lessons are still fresh in our collective memory. Building military and civilian formations capable of integrating is best accomplished during peace rather than in the stresses of conflict.

[83] Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power*, 164.

Appendix A: Interagency Cooperation Embedded in US Army and Joint Doctrine

Types of Interagency Cooperation Embedded in Current Doctrine

Recognizing the importance of operating in a joint, interagency, interorganizational, and multinational environment, US military doctrine codifies operations within such a diverse environment as "unified action." Defined, "unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and-or integrates joint, single-service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, Intergovernmental Organizations, and the private sector to achieve unity of effort."[84] Key to the definition of unified action is "achieving unity of effort." Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization.[85] In military operations unity of command is an important principle; however, in civil-military operations the challenge is how to create unity of effort among diverse actors in stability operations.

Army doctrine describes unified action operations focused on stability operations using two approaches: whole-of-government approach and comprehensive approach. Both approaches seek to achieve unity of effort, differing depending on the nature of the partnerships.[86]

A whole-of-government approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.[87] Accordingly, success in a whole-of-government approach depends on the ability of civilians and military forces to plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively through an integrated interagency approach to a fundamentally dynamic situation.[88] A key component of a whole-of-government approach is an integrated military-interagency effort. Whole-of-government planning refers to processes sponsored by the National Security Council (NSC) by which multiple USG departments and agencies come together to develop plans that address critical challenges to national interests.[89] According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, whole-of-

[84] US Department of Defense, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 2013, II-7.

[85] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Stability*, ADRP 3-07, 1-3.

[86] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Stability*, FM 3-07, 3-1.

[87] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Stability*, ADRP 3-07, 1-4.

[88] Ibid.

[89] US Department of Defense, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, II-2.

government planning is distinct, from the contributions of USG departments and agencies to DoD planning, which remains a DoD responsibility.[90]

Joint Publication 3-08 recognizes that a primary challenge for integrating civilian and military planning into a whole-of-government process is addressing the different planning capacity and culture in civilian agencies, in contrast to DoD.[91] Both joint and Army doctrine recognize the challenges of the whole-of-government approach and recommend that a successful whole-of-government approach requires that all actors:

1. Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process;
2. Develop and maintain a shared understanding of the situation and problem;
3. Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal;
4. Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities;
5. Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goals;
6. Allocate resources to ensure continuation of information sharing, common understanding, and integrated efforts; and[92]
7. Require a designated lead or primary agency with all USG instruments of national power represented, actively participating, and integrated into the process.[93]

The second approach in achieving unity of effort stability operations is a comprehensive approach. A comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG and, to the extent possible, intergovernmental and NGOs, multinational partners, and private sector entities, to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.[94] A comprehensive approach is different than a whole-of-government approach in that integration and collaboration are often missing among the diverse actors involved. A comprehensive approach, rather, achieves unity of effort through

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Stability*, ADRP 3-07, 1-4.

[93] U.S. Department of Defense, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, II-2.

[94] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Stability*, ADRP 3-07, 1-4.

extensive cooperation and coordination, to forge a shared understanding of a common goal.[95] Figure 4 illustrates the differing levels of military-interagency-interorganizational unity of effort as framed by Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07.

Figure 4: Unity of Effort Approaches to Stability (Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Stability*, ADRP 3-01, 1–5)*



Achieving unity of effort in a comprehensive approach requires leaders to utilize coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, compromise, consultation, and deconfliction among all stakeholders.[96] Interestingly, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07 notes that the comprehensive approach is often more appropriate than a focused military approach, because taking an authoritative, military approach often counters effective interorganizational relationships, impedes unified action, and compromises mission accomplishment.[97]

For the comprehensive approach, Field Manual 3-07 recommends establishing mechanisms such as CMOCs to aid in facilitating coordination. Specifically, a CMOC can facilitate information sharing and coordination between Army units and other partners, including the host nation's population and

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid., 1-5.

[97] Ibid., 1-5.

institutions.[98] Establishing the CMOC is a responsibility of Army civil affairs units. Articulated as part of a comprehensive approach, the CMOC is used to primarily coordinate stability activities among a wide range of partners, to include the civilian population of the host nation, rather than an integrated DoD-interagency institution found within a whole-of-government approach.

[98] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Stability*, FM 3-07, 3-25.

Appendix B: At What Level Does Interagency Integration Currently Occur?

One of the limiting criteria that currently prevents more integrated interagency involvement is the capacity of USG departments and agencies to support DoD planning.[99] Unlike the military, most USG agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with the result that military personnel interface with interagency personnel who are coordinating activities on behalf of their organization at multiple levels of war.[100] The military coordinates at the national strategic level through the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff; at the theater strategic level through the combatant command (COCOM); at the operational level through COCOMs, JTFs, and corps; and at the tactical level through divisions and below. Most USG agencies operate at the national strategic level with their home agencies in Washington DC and at the field level through their country teams.[101] As a result, USG policy currently has the COCOM level as the primary embed point for institutionalized and integrated interagency cooperation and coordination, which is at a strategic and operational level of war. At each COCOM is a type of JIACG, which is composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander.[102]

The JIACGs provide the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments.[103] JIACGs support the entire range of military operations and provide a two-way link back to interagency partners' parent organizations to help synchronize operations with the efforts of USG agencies, departments, and NSC (see figure 5).[104] Combatant commanders utilize JIACGs as their lead organization for interagency coordination, providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of interagency activities (see figure 6).[105]

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[99] US Department of Defense, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, II-6.

[100] Ibid., II-19.

[101] Ibid., D-4.

[102] Ibid., II-10.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid., D-3.

[105] Ibid., D-4.

Figure 5: Relationship of JIACG with NSC (Source: US Department of Defense, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, D-2)*



Figure 6: JIACG Structure and Functions (Source: US Department of Defense, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, D-10)*



On an ad hoc basis, USG agencies will also support JTFs. Within the US Army, JTFs are usually built around a corps HQ, which functions at the operational level of war, rather than the tactical. If a JTF is formed for a contingency operation, the combatant commander may integrate selected members of the JIACG into the JTF.[106] Additionally, according to JP 3-08, depending on the type of operation; the extent of military operations; and the degree of interagency, intergovernmental organization, and NGO involvement, the focal point for operational- and tactical-level coordination with civilian agencies occurs at the JTF HQ, the joint field office, the CMOC, or the humanitarian operations center.

In the case of the CMOC, Field Manual 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, indicates that CMOCs are supported by civil affairs brigades that are under the operational control of a JTF or corps.[107] Civil affairs battalions from the civil affairs brigades are usually task organized to divisions and can also set up a CMOC within a division's area of operations, with the Division G-9 providing direction and oversight.[108] CMOCs serve as the primary coordination interface and provide operational- and tactical-level coordination between military forces and other stakeholders.[109]

Field Manual 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team*, makes no mention of supporting a CMOC; in fact, the S-9, or civil affairs operations staff officer, is normally authorized only at division and corps levels. Once deployed, units below division level may be authorized an S-9.[110]

Also at the tactical and operational levels are PRTs. A PRT is an interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of the host nation's local government.[111] PRTs tend to be ad hoc, varying in structure, size, charter, and mission sets designed around the capabilities of participating USG agencies and the needs and capabilities of the host nation. PRTs operate by combining security forces for protection with other interagency personnel for support, development, and governance, integrated together into one team.[112] The integration and

[106] Ibid., D-9.

[107] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, 3-7.

[108] Ibid., 6-11.

[109] U.S. Department of Defense, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, IV-26.

[110] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Brigade Combat Team*, 3-18.

[111] US Department of Defense, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, IV-32.

[112] Ibid., IV-33.

reporting structure of PRTs with battlespace-owning military units is dependent on the theater. According to JP 3-08, USG PRTs have tactical objectives with a strategic focus and exemplify the nature of a true joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operational environment.[113]

Interagency can also be formed around a joint interagency task force (JIATF), when the mission requires close integration of two or more USG agencies.[114] Chartered by DoD and one or more civilian agencies, JIATFs typically are formed for a specific task and purpose as a formal organization. They are guided by memorandum of agreement, memorandum of understanding, and other founding documents that define roles, responsibilities, and relationships of JIATF members.[115] According to JP 3-08, JIATFs may be separate elements under a JTF, or they may be subordinate to a functional component command, a joint special-operations task force, or a staff section such as the J-3.[116] The examples provided by JP 3-08 of JIATFs include JIATF West, JIATF South, National Counterterrorism Center, and National Joint Terrorism Task Force, all of which are formed around strategic and operational mission sets.

Interagency Personnel Management in Support of Stability Operations

According to JP 3-08, the secretary of state may direct the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization to coordinate integrated USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities, including ensuring harmonization with any planned or ongoing military operations, and by convoking an interagency management system response to a crisis.[117] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2004 directed that the State Department create the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Office, comprised of about a hundred predominantly non-State Department personnel, in order to strike a new balance in the interagency relationship between Departments of State and Defense.[118] The DoS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was provided the authority to set reconstruction and stabilization strategy, to develop policy and manage program execution, and to

[113] Ibid., F-1.

[114] Ibid., II-20.

[115] Ibid., E-1.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Ibid., G-1.

[118] Rosenwasser and Warner, "History of the Interagency Process for Foreign Relations in the United States," 25.

coordinate with foreign and NGO partners.[119] Specifically, the interagency management system is designed for the interagency and military commanders to manage reconstruction and stabilization operations by ensuring coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical field levels.[120] The DoS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which has since 2011 been integrated into the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, maintains a roster of potential team members and develops supporting memorandums of understanding with appropriate DoS bureaus and other federal agencies, in order to quickly coordinate and support COCOM HQ or JIACGs.[121]

The DoS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, or Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, also has the authority to field advanced civilian teams to support embassies' chiefs of mission. The size, structure, and composition of the advanced civilian teams are flexible, to meet particular requirements of each contingency situation.[122] Advanced civilian teams are intended to quickly set up, coordinate, and conduct field-level reconstruction and stability operations; this includes performing assessments and coordinating USG operations in uncertain and hostile environments, with or without military deployment.[123]

[119] Ibid., 25.

[120] US Department of Defense, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, G-1.

[121] Ibid., G-9.

[122] Ibid., G-2.

[123] Ibid., G-11.

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